Webster G. Tarpley
February 10, 2010
The Detroit Christmas bomber was deliberately and intentionally allowed to keep his US entry visa as the result of a national security override issued by an as yet unknown US intelligence or law-enforcement agency with the goal of blocking the State Department’s planned revocation of that visa. This is the result of hearings held on January 27 before the House Homeland Security Committee, and in particular of the testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary of State for Management. The rickety US government official version of the December 25 Detroit underwear bomber incident, which has been jerry-built over the past month and a half, has now totally collapsed, and key elements of the terrorism-spawning rogue network inside US agencies and departments are unusually vulnerable to a determined campaign of exposure.
These developments decisively confirm the analysis offered by the present writer in a Dec. 28, 2009 television interview on Russia Today.1 On that occasion, my estimate was that Mutallab was a protected patsy being used by rogue elements of the US intelligence community for the deliberate and intentional creation of a high profile incident with the goal of obtaining a large-scale political effect. On January 4, Richard Wolffe reported on the MSNBC Countdown program that the Obama White House was investigating whether the Detroit Christmas incident had been “intentionally” created by an intelligence network with an “alternative agenda.”2 It was in this report that Wolffe posed the alternative of “cock-up or conspiracy.”3 Unfortunately, Obama opted for the screw-up version on January 5.
Based on what was already known a few days after this incident, it was clear that normal screening and surveillance procedures had been scrapped and aborted in order to allow the youthful patsy Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab of Nigeria to board his flight from Amsterdam in the Netherlands to Detroit. Mutallab’s father, a rich, well known, and reputable Nigerian banker had gone to the US Embassy in his country and formally warned a State Department official as well as a CIA representative that his son was in Yemen and in all probability consorting with terrorists. Under normal circumstances, this report alone would have been more than enough to get Mutallab’s US visa revoked in the same way he had already been denied entry to Great Britain. He also would normally have been placed on the no-fly list, thus setting up two insuperable obstacles to getting on his Detroit bound flight and winging off to produce an incident which caused several weeks of public hysteria in this country, completely with demands for body scanners in airports. In addition, the US intelligence community had reports that a Nigerian was training with the purported “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” in Yemen. Obama had called a December 22 meeting with top CIA, FBI, and DHS officials because of reports of a terrorist attack looming during the Christmas holiday.
The January 27 hearings of the House Homeland Security Committee were also addressed by Michael Leiter, the AWOL Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, along with Jane Holl Lute, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, who was sent in place of HHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, who boycotted the hearings. But the important testimony came from Kennedy, whose responsibilities include Consular Services, and therefore visas. In his opening statement, Kennedy offered a tortured circumlocution to describe what had happened. Attempting to head off the question of why the State Department had not revoked Mutallab’s visa, Kennedy stated:
“We will use revocation authority prior to interagency consultation in circumstances where we believe there is an immediate threat. Revocation is an important tool in our border security arsenal. At the same time, expeditious coordination with our national security partners is not to be underestimated. There have been numerous cases where our unilateral and uncoordinated revocation would have disrupted important investigations that were underway by one of our national security partners. They had the individual under investigation and our revocation action would have disclosed the U.S. Government’s interest in the individual and ended our colleagues’ ability to quietly pursue the case and identify terrorists’ plans and co-conspirators.” 4
Undersecretary Kennedy: An Agency Objected to Revoking Visa
Not surprisingly, House Homeland Security Chairman Bennie Thompson (D-MS) wanted to know what that really meant. Here is his exchange with Undersecretary Kennedy:
REP. THOMPSON: Okay. So — all right. So he has a visa. So what does that do? In the process, does it revoke the visa? Does it —
MR. KENNEDY: We — as I mentioned in my statement, Mr. Chairman, if we unilaterally revoked a visa — and there was a case recently up — we have a request from a law enforcement agency to not revoke the visa. We came across information; we said this is a dangerous person. We were ready to revoke the visa. We then went to the community and said, should we revoke this visa? And one of the members — and we’d be glad to give you that out of — in private — said, please do not revoke this visa. We have eyes on this person. We are following this person who has the visa for the purpose of trying roll up an entire network, not just stop one person. So we will revoke the visa of any individual who is a threat to the United States, but we do take one preliminary step. We ask our law enforcement and intelligence community partners, do you have eyes on this person, and so you want us to let this person proceed under your surveillance so that you may potentially break a larger plot?
REP. THOMPSON: Well, I think that the point that I’m trying to get at is, is this just another box you’re checking, or is that some security value to add in that box, to the list?
MR. KENNEDY: The intelligence and law enforcement community tell us that they believe in certain cases that there’s a higher value of them following this person so they can find his or her co-conspirators and roll up an entire plot against the United States, rather than simply knock out one soldier in that effort.5
What Kennedy is saying is that the established bureaucratic routine calls for the State Department to inquire of the other intelligence and law enforcement agencies that compose the US intelligence community whether they have any objection to the lifting of a visa. In this case, reports Kennedy, there was such an objection from at least one agency, based on their contention that Mutallab was under intensive scrutiny as part of an operation which might lead to the discovery and arrest of far bigger fish. We should also notice that Kennedy is extremely reluctant to speak before the committee in public session about exactly which intelligence or law-enforcement agency this was, and that the members of the committee do not demand an immediate straight answer. Perhaps Kennedy told them later, behind the closed doors of a secret executive session. But after weeks of hysteria, the public has a right to know.
Classic Use of National Security Override to Protect A Patsy
What we see here is a classic example of the use of a national security override on the part of subversive moles who are performing their most basic responsibility of protecting a patsy by preventing him from being arrested or otherwise interfered with until that patsy can perform his assigned task and produce the desired incident, with the goal of inducing an intensive political response in the form of a wave of public hysteria. With this method, the name of the patsy is in effect flagged in all the relevant databases with the notation that this person is the target of an ongoing investigation which cannot be interfered with because of overriding national security concerns. This means that the patsy in question is immune to arrest by traffic cops, airport and border officials, or any other law enforcement official. The patsy is untouchable — until of course the terrorist provocation has been carried out.
Various alleged 9/11 figures operated for extended periods of time inside the US, evidently under the cover of such national security overrides. How did the accused 19 9/11 hijackers enter and leave this country, obtain visas, rent apartments, acquire checking accounts and credit cards, obtain driver’s licenses, register vehicles, rent cars, attend flight schools, and repeatedly fly on US domestic airlines? How did they escape arrest for traffic violations, which some of them committed? The answer is in all likelihood that they had been made untouchable to ordinary law enforcement because their names had been flagged with national security overrides which made them immune to arrest for routine infractions or because their names appeared on watch lists and similar databases.
Congressman Michael McCaul (R-TX) returned to this sensitive issue in his questioning of Undersecretary Kennedy, leading to the following exchange:
REP. MCCAUL: Well, I think there needs to be a lot better coordination going on here between these two entities. And Mr. Kennedy, why given the information that you had, why wasn’t the VISA revoked?
MR. KENNEDY: Sir, as I mentioned earlier, when we get any information, when anyone appears at an American embassy and they say that they have doubts about someone, we immediately generate what is called a visa VIPER message. We sent that to the entire law enforcement and intelligence —
REP. MCCAUL: My problem — I understand the process. But you had this information, and you didn’t revoke the VISA.
MR. KENNEDY: Because —
REP. MCCAUL: I mean the cable I just read makes it pretty clear that this man is associated with extremists in Yemen, and you didn’t revoke his VISA.
MR. KENNEDY: What it was, sir, is his father said he was associated with this. And so we then asked the intelligence and law enforcement communities if they have any other information. I don’t want to take much of your time, and I’d glad to visit with you afterwards. 6
We note again the tremendous reticence of Undersecretary Kennedy in getting into the details of how the national security override was issued in the case of Mutallab’s visa. Kennedy suggests he will explain it all to the Congressman in private, but not in the full glare of public opinion were his words will end up on the Federal News transcript.
Demand to Know Who Let Mutallab Keep His Visa
Instead, it is imperative for the preservation of democratic institutions that the full details be known of how the State Department was prevented from revoking Mutallab’s visa. We want to know which agency demanded that Mutallab not be interfered with. We want to know the names and posts held by the officials who issued the override of the State Department’s proposal. We want these officials fired. We want these officials thoroughly investigated. We want them to appear before public congressional hearings. We want them to be the targets of civil suits by airlines and other interested parties. We want to find out the nature of any privately controlled intelligence networks to which they may belong. Such an investigation may well lead outside of the United States, and most particularly to the United Kingdom. Mutallab comes from Nigeria, a former British colony. He spent several years in London, the site of MI-6’s Londonistan school for Islamic fundamentalist extremist patsies and fanatics, where he was apparently radicalized. Mutallab was then you sheep dipped into Yemen, another former British colony, where he was placed in contact with Awlaki the CIA lackey, a notorious double agent and agent provocateur. Given the fact that Mutallab was operating outside of this US, the CIA is an obvious suspect, but not the only one.
There is every reason to conclude that the rogue network of moles operating inside US intelligence — otherwise known as the invisible government or shadow government — knew that Mutallab was coming, knew that he would be carrying a device resembling a bomb, and wanted him to enter the skies over Detroit. (Whether Mutallab’s handlers thought they were giving him a bomb that would actually go off is a separate question.) They did all this because they sincerely wanted a major terrorist provocation of the US population, designed to unleash waves of Islamophobic hysteria that would be useful for the support of ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and quite possibly against Iran.
Not Body Scanners, But Mole Detectors at CIA and FBI
Earlier commentaries on this incident had alleged a failure to connect the dots. As it now transpires, the dots were evidently connected by the State Department, but their action was blocked by an override issued by another agency. Another popular cover story for the failure of screening and surveillance on Christmas between Amsterdam and Detroit was that Mutallab’s name had been misspelled when entered into the relevant antiterrorist database. Kennedy conceded in his testimony that one such data entry was misspelled, but another one was entered accurately. All of this needs to be viewed with great skepticism.
Apart from these details, it should be clear to all that the official US account of the Detroit Christmas incident has now been completely refuted. We do not need body scanners at airports. We need mole detectors installed at the CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA, State Department, NCTC, and the National Security Council. The urgent necessity is now to find out precisely who issued a critical override that allowed Mutallab to keep his visa and board his flight to Detroit. Pull on that thread and revelations might well follow that lead back to the networks behind 9/11, Iran Contra, and much else. Political forces friendly to Obama have tended to see this case as staged in order to embarrass the tenant of the White House. These forces should now demand immediate congressional hearings into the allegations contained in Undersecretary Kennedy’s testimony.
5See Federal News Service transcript of the Q&A before the committee at: http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=25151&docId=l:1117012781&start=15 , emphasis added.
6See Federal News Service transcript of the Q&A before the committee at: http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=25151&docId=l:1117012781&start=15 , emphasis added.